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FIRST AMENDMENT LOCHNERISM & THE
ORIGINS OF THE INCORPORATION
DOCTRINE
James Y. Stern*
The 20th century emergence ofthe incorporation doctrine is regarded
as a critical development in constitutional law, but while issues related to
the doctrine's justification have been studied and debated for more than
fifty years, the causes and mechanics of its advent have received relatively
little academic attention. This Essay, part of a symposium on Judge Jeffrey
Sutton's recent book about state constitutional law, examines the doctrinal
origins of incorporation, in an effort to help uncover why the incorporation
doctrine emerged when it did and the way it did. It concludes that, for these
purposes, incorporation is best understood as having three basic compo-
nents, of which First Amendment incorporation predominated. It goes on
to show how First Amendment incorporation drew in important ways from
existing doctrine, including important strands of "Lochnerian" jurispru-
dence, and was structured in a way that in turn facilitated subsequent in-
corporation of criminal procedure protections. Finally, it notes that in its
critical beginning moments, incorporation decisions did not consider, much
less adjudicate, the kinds of issues that are today central to discussions of
judicial federalism.
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Ever a shrewd operator, Justice Brennan could see what was coming. From
the beginning of his tenure on the Supreme Court in 1956, Brennan had helped
midwife a transformation in constitutional law centered on an aggressive xpan-
sion of certain individual rights against the government.1 But by the mid-1970s,
after four Nixon appointments to the Court, Brennan's only steadfast remaining
ally was Justice Thurgood Marshall.2 Recognizing the need for a Plan B, Bren-
nan used the occasion of a public speech to make a simple suggestion. States
have their own constitutions, he observed, which often contain similar or even
textually identical provisions to those in the federal constitution, and the states
were free to interpret their own constitutions to provide more expansive re-
strictions on state power than those recognized as a matter federal constitutional
law.3 That, he suggested, was precisely what they should do. Brennan published
his proposal in the Harvard Law Review.4 Though only sixteen pages long, the
article helped spur a significant expansion in state constitutional law by state
courts and gave rise to a hefty literature on what came to be called "judicial fed-
eralism."
More than forty years later, Sixth Circuit Judge Jeffrey Sutton has taken up
Brennan's themes with almost missionary zeal, though a different focus. This
work has culminated in a book-length treatment of the dynamics of judicial fed-
eralism that is lively, sophisticated, and penetrating.5 It describes nuances in the
development of constitutional rights over the twentieth century with subtlety and
complexity that defies simple reduction, but so far as there is an overarching
theme or thesis, it is to encourage a measure of skepticism about the expansion
of federal rights by federal courts. Such expansion, he argues, may have the ef-
fect of foreclosing or stunting the expansion of rights as a matter of state consti-
tutional law, and federal constitutional rights may turn out to be less protective
or less well suited to local conditions than state constitutional rights. In this sense,
Sutton's work bookends Brennan's. Where Brennan encouraged the expansion
state-law rights beyond the domain of federal protection, Sutton's work suggests
federal rights might be pressed less vigorously in recognition of the protective
capacity of state constitutional law.6
Viewed in historical perspective, this judicial conversation is a remarkable
thing. Our contemporary "rights-talk," our understanding of the Constitution as
a set of individual rights, and our view of the judiciary as the institutional em-
bodiment of both-in short, our implicit notion that rights, constitution, and
courts are one and the same-is a relatively recent development. This outlook is
1. John Fox, William Joseph Brennan, THIRTEEN: THE SUPREME COURT (Dec. 2006), https://www.thir-
teen.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/robes_brennan.html.
2. Id.
3. Id
4. See generally william J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977); see also william J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 548 (1986),
5. See generally JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018).
6. Compare State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, supra note 4, at 491, with
SUTTON, supra note 5.
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almost certainly sustained in part by a loose, unarticulated assumption that there
is really only one constitution and one body of courts to interpret it, itself headed
by a single tribunal with ultimate authority to pronounce upon its meaning. State
constitutions and state courts are at most an afterthought; the federal Constitution
and the federal courts-especially the Supreme Court-are where the action is.
For much of American history, such an assumption would have been trans-
parently untenable. In his discussion of state constitutional law, Brennan consid-
ered various transformations ushered in by the Supreme Court after the New
Deal, and concluded that the most significant of these, at least from the stand-
point of state courts, was neither the Court's equal protection, fundamental rights
or procedural due process decisions-exemplified by cases like Brown v.
Board,? Reynolds v. Sims,8 Roe v. Wade,9 and Goldberg v. Kelly. 10 Rather, in his
estimation it was the Court's decisions making virtually all the provisions of the
Bill of Rights binding on the states that would prove most significant "in pre-
serving and furthering the ideals we have fashioned for our society."" The first
eight amendments to the federal Constitution originally applied only to the fed-
eral government,12 and the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment changed
this structural principle was understood to have been rejected by the Supreme
Court not long after the Amendment had been ratified.13 The so-called incorpo-
ration doctrine reversed that result and was by any measure one of the Warren
Court's major legacies.14 It was the incorporation doctrine that necessitated
Brennan's intervention and the incorporation doctrine that underlies the pathol-
ogies Sutton seeks to uncover. It is only because federal constitutional rights have
expanded to cover a wide array of state conduct that here is any need to contem-
plate state constitutional law as an alternative avenue of protection.
The literature on incorporation is vast, but at heart its orientation, if not its
goal, is almost universally prescriptive. '5 Although the question is asked from a
7. See Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
9. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. See Goldberg v. Kelly 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
11. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, supra note 4, at 493.
12. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833).
13. This conclusion is generally associated with the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77-78 (1873),
but it is unclear whether that is correct. It can more plausibly be traced to United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 554-55 (1875).
14. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 50 WASH & LEE L. REv. 5, 9
(1993).
15. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989); KURT
LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014);
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1986); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57
(1993); Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State
Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1954); William Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); Charles Fairman, A Reply to Professor Crosskey, 22 U. CHI. L.
REv. 144 (1954); Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 Nw. L. REV. 61 (2011); John Harrison, Re-
constructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, (1992); Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges
or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last? ", 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405 (1972); Robert G. Natelson,
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wide range of methodological perspectives, treatments of incorporation gener-
ally center on the question of whether incorporation was justified or unjustified,
a good thing or a bad thing. By contrast, relatively little attention has been given
to the question of how incorporation came about and the conditions that gave rise
to this transformation in American constitutional law. The origins of incorpora-
tion may also have prescriptive implications, of course; knowing what has been
done may well offer some insight into what ought to be done. The aim of this
Essay, however, is merely descriptive. Apart from situating the question of ori-
gins within the context of the larger set of issues raised by Brennan, Sutton, and
others, the goal here is simply to trace out some important pieces of the story-
though by no means all of them.16 The focus, it should be noted, is on the doc-
trinal context, rather than personal, political, intellectual, or social factors. While
such external considerations were almost certainly critical causal factors, the as-
sumption here is that the legal context mattered as well, both in facilitating in-
corporation of any sort as well as shaping the form that incorporation eventually
took. To give a blunt example, it is less likely the Constitution's rights guarantees
would have been made applicable to the states were it not for the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The discussion that follows is centered on this facet
of the incorporation story.
Before going further, it may be useful to provide a quick sketch of the four
principal conclusions that this Essay reaches. First, the Twentieth Century incor-
poration story has three basic doctrinal pieces: the Takings Clause, the First
Amendment, and the various rights generally associated with the enforcement of
criminal law. Second, the most central player was the First Amendment, and es-
pecially the right to freedom of speech. Among other things, the structure of con-
stitutional free speech protection allowed for strategic shifts between informal-
ism and formalism that helped to enable the subsequent incorporation of the
criminal procedure guarantees. And since states, not the federal government,
were the central focus in the development of these rights, understanding the ori-
gins of incorporation largely means understanding the origins of modern free
speech doctrine itself.
Third, the view of incorporation as a progressive or left-liberal project is
only half-right. Incorporation grew out of existing doctrine that developed in the
period preceding the New Deal constitutional transformation and was supported
in important ways by those members of the Supreme Court least disposed to that
transformation. Had it not been for the jurisprudential developments associated
with the so-called Lochner Era in American constitutional history, it is doubtful
incorporation would have occurred.17 While it would not be accurate to view
The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. REv. 1117 (2009); Bryan H. wilden-
thal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867-73,
18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 153 (2009).
16. See supra notes 4, 5, 15 and accompanying text.
17. Fears that incorporation was vulnerable to the now-familiar criticisms leveled against Lochner in turn
helped shape the development of incorporation doctrine. See Richard Boldt & Dan Friedman, Constitutional
Incorporation: A Consideration of the Judicial Function in State and Federal Constitutional Interpretation, 76
MD. L. REv. 309, 317 (2017).
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incorporation as "Lochnerian," discontinuities between the pre- and post-New
Deal Courts are easily overstated.
Finally, as the foregoing may hint, the origins of the incorporation doctrine
have little or nothing to do with the considerations that drive the analysis today.
The beginnings of incorporation were not rooted in any sustained analysis of the
text or history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor did those beginnings involve
any significant contemplation of the role states, state constitutions, or state courts
might play in the development of the law of individual rights. The federalism
values highlighted by Justice Brennan and Judge Sutton did not enter the calculus
in any serious way. And while later stages in the life of the incorporation doctrine
appear to have been driven in significant part the attractions of its acquired for-
malism-which tended to force the expansion of constitutional rights in some
ways and to contract it in others-incorporation in its early years did not serve
either of these formalist aims.
One threshold conceptual and linguistic issue should be addressed before
embarking on a discussion of constitutional "incorporation." While many varia-
tions are possible, broadly speaking incorporation can be thought about in either
of two basic ways. The first is what will be referred to here as an overlap theory
of incorporation. This is the view that the Fourteenth Amendment, while not
making the amendments comprising the Bill of Rights operative on the states,
nevertheless limits state action in ways that coincide with the constraints on fed-
eral action imposed by the Bill of Rights, at least to a considerable extent. On
this view, the Fourteenth Amendment has its own inner logic, and while this may
result in some degree of parallelism with the Bill of Rights, it is only because
they share a common source, whether as a matter of legal tradition or natural
justice. An overlap conception might still treat the content of the Bill of Rights
as relevant to the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but would reject
the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment imports protections of the Bill of
Rights in any formal or direct sense.
In contrast to an overlap theory, a cross-reference theory of incorporation
treats the Fourteenth Amendment as commanding the states to obey provisions
of the Bill of Rights, essentially nullifying the doctrine of Barron v. Baltimore.18
In effect, such a view treats the Fourteenth Amendment as having amended the
text of first eight amendments themselves by inserting language declaring that
the rights they specify bind the state and federal governments alike.19 A cross-
reference theory strongly implies that legal doctrines implementing these various
rights should be the same for the states and the federal government, "jot-for-jot
and case-for-case."20 To a lesser degree, it also tends to favor the "total incorpo-
ration" approach advocated by Justice Hugo Black, in which all of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights are binding on the states. And while it does not necessarily
18. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247-51 (1833).
19. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Neither Congress nor any] state shall make any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.").
20. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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preclude the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment restricts the states in
other, more open-ended ways apart from the enumerated protections in the Bill
of Rights, it may also be thought to have some tendency to do that as well.
21
The word "incorporation" might seem to imply a cross-reference concep-
tion, but in the discussion that follows, it refers to either type of understanding,
so long as the result is to subject the states to constraints substantially akin to
those to which the federal government is subject under the enumerated provisions
of the Bill of Rights.22 The language of incorporation is itself a bit strange, re-
flecting shifts in conceptions of how the doctrine operates. In ordinary speech,
the verb incorporate means something like include or bring within. Normally,
one doesn't speak of incorporating something against someone else. Numerous
Supreme Court opinions have used this phrasing, however-though, tellingly,
none prior to the mid-1980s23-and some of these have spoken in terms not of
the Fourteenth Amendment but of the Court incorporating a particular provi-
sion.24 These patterns of usage reflect a metamorphosis over time in which a
doctrine that began as one anchored to an overlap understanding evolved into a
cross-reference theory-indeed, the Court itself has on occasion referred only to
the Bill of Rights provision at issue in a challenge to a state law, omitting mention
of the Fourteenth Amendment altogether. 25 But while today it may be natural to
equate incorporation with a cross-reference conception, treating the verb "incor-
porate" as a synonym for the verb apply, the term here should be understood to
include the overlap understanding as well, for it was the overlap understanding
that guided the earliest incorporation cases.
In characterizing different approaches, the question is how much weight is
given to the inclusion or omission of a given constitutional protection in the Con-
stitution's first eight amendments. A view of the Fourteenth Amendment as nom-
inally independent but that nevertheless gives dispositive weight to the contents
of the Bill of Rights provisions is operationally a cross-reference approach oper-
ating under a fig-leaf of talk about overlap. The nature of the distinction and of
the ambiguities that may arise in borderline cases is important to understand be-
cause gradual increases in the presumptive weight given to the Bill of Rights in
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment seem to have helped bring about a
transition from an overlap to a cross-reference approach over time.
21. Compare, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-86 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) with Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 66, 89-92 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (due process "has an independent potency"
and the Fourteenth Amendment "neither comprehends the specific provisions by which the founders deemed it
appropriate to restrict by federal government nor is it confined to them.").
22. At one point, this it was also referred to as the "absorption" theory.
23. See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1979 (2019); Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469, 508 n.1 (2005).
24. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35,48 (2008); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1875 (2017)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The distinction is also elided at times through passive constructions. See, e.g., Kelo, 545
U.S. at 508 n.i; City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 716 (1999).
25. See, e.g., Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 516 (2012) (per curiam).
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In other cases, an overlap approach can be harder to identify since it does
not require an explicit reference to a provision of the Bill of Rights, and, moreo-
ver, it might entail a somewhat different (generally narrower)2 scope of protec-
tion than the federal enumerated right. Many constitutional provisions could be
said to overlap to some degree, but that does not necessarily amount to incorpo-
ration. For example, a federal statute purporting to bestow the hereditary title of
"Defender of the Faith" might be considered a violation of both the Title of No-
bility and the Establishment Clauses, but that confluence does not establish any
meaningful linkage between the two clauses for purposes of this analysis. While
perfect congruity isn't necessary, incorporation on an overlap understanding
arises only where the core elements of the right recognized under the Fourteenth
Amendment generally align with those of a specific constitutional right set out
in the first eight amendments. The limits of what can reasonably be counted as
incorporation are important to have in focus because the Supreme Court in the
days before explicit incorporation at times intervened in criminal prosecutions to
invalidate grossly unjust proceedings in ways that to some extent paralleled the
enumerated criminal procedure rights, but these were generally too sporadic and
individualized to support a claim that a particular federal guarantee was also ap-
plicable to the states. 7
I. THE THREE PRE-HELLER INCORPORATIONS
It is common to speak in terms of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights or
of the Constitution's first eight amendments.28 This tends to give the impression
that there are eight distinct guarantees and to suggest a diverse array of constitu-
tional concerns-not o mention an extended time period over which incorpora-
tion gradually unfolded, given the Supreme Court's stated adoption of a piece-
meal "partial incorporation" analysis.29 This isn't really accurate, however,
particularly when it comes to understanding how the historical development of
incorporation came about. Second Amendment incorporation did not occur until
2010, long after the central incorporation battle was a fait accompli-indeed, it
was justified in substantial part by the argument that non-incorporation would be
26. where incorporation is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Amend-
ment's protections against state action will not exceed protections against federal action under the Bill of Rights,
provided the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses are interpreted identically. But see Ryan C.
Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408,415 (2010).
27. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
28. E.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936); Richard Boldt & Dan Friedman, Con-
stitutional Incorporation: A Consideration of the Judicial Function in State and Federal Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 76 MD. L. REv. 309, 315 (2017). Or "the first ten Amendments." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
29. See Boldt & Friedman, supra note 28, at 323-24.
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anomalous given how much else had been incorporated decades earlier.30 The
Third and Seventh Amendments, meanwhile, have never been incorporated.31
The five remaining amendments contain multiple clauses articulating dis-
tinct rights, but they can be grouped into three basic categories, both in terms of
subject-matter and historical sequence: (1) the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause, (2) the First Amendment, which contains four major operative provisions
and two more minor ones, and (3) the dozen or so protections generally associ-
ated with criminal prosecution set out in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments.32 Each of the three domains of constitutional protection originated
in an overlap conception and each eventually transmuted into one based on a
cross-reference understanding. Takings protection was the first to be applied to
the states, but the last to be recognized as incorporated in the modern, cross-
reference sense. It will be discussed in greater detail shortly, but it is for the most
part orthogonal to the larger incorporation story.
30. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780-81, (2010). In addition, the Court formally held that the
Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause was applicable to the states in 2019. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.
Ct. 682, 686-87 (2019).
31. The Supreme Court has had no occasion to consider incorporation of the Third Amendment, since the
right it protects appears to be in no danger of infringement. The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amend-
ment's civil jury trial right does not apply to state court proceedings as recently as 1916, and this decision has
been treated as rejecting incorporation, although by its terms the case discussed whether the Seventh Amendment
applied directly of its own force. See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217-18
(1916); see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 784 n.30. Besides the Third and Seventh Amendments, incorporation of
the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by grand jury has been rejected. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 538 (1884).
32. While at least some of these provisions, most notably the Fourth Amendment, have some significant
implications in other contexts, see City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 755-56 (2010), their roles in the
enforcement of criminal law have largely driven their modem development generally and their application to the
states specifically.
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The criminal procedure rights, while numerous, fell like dominoes so that
it is accurate to speak of their incorporation as essentially a single historical phe-
nomenon.33 Virtually all of the enumerated criminal procedure rights were in-
corporated in the eight years between 196134 and 1969,35 during which period
the Court accepted every incorporation claim it considered and repeatedly over-
turned prior decisions-most of which had been handed down after the Court's
New Deal transformation-expressly rejecting incorporation of the rights at is-
sue.36
The First Amendment also contains multiple clauses, but, for the most part,
these too were largely incorporated in one swoop. Incorporation of the rights of
freedom of speech and freedom of press occurred somewhere between 1925 and
33. There are a handful of either clear or possible exceptions to the incorporation of the criminal procedure
rights during this period. First, Fourteenth Amendment incorporation of the Fifth Amendment Grand Jury right
was explicitly rejected in the Court's 1884 Hurtado decision, and the Court did not decide any cases either af-
firming or overturning that decision during the period, although in dictum it spoke of the case as settled law in
Beck v. Washington. See 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962); see also id. at 579 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Second, while
the Sixth Amendment criminal jury right has been applied to the states, a unique decision resulting from an
unusual alignment among the Court's members held that states are not subject to the rule that this right implicitly
requires unanimous verdicts. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972); see also McDonald, 380 U.S.
at 766 n.14 (discussing Apodaca). Third, the Court appears not to have decided any cases squarely addressing
the incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment during this period, an issue recently
addressed by the Court. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. 682 at 687; see also supra note 31. Finally, while the Court today
says that the Excessive Bail Clause was incorporated in Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971), see McDonald,
380 U.S. at 764 n.12, that view rests on an ambiguous dictum in Schilb that a right against excessive bail "has
been assumed to have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." Schilb, 404 U.S. at 357.
34. Certain earlier cases accepted narrower constitutional rights that to some extent overlapped with fed-
eral protections. See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 200-02 (1948); Powell v. Alabama 287 U.S. 45, 72-73
(1932); see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,267-78 (1948) (public trial in criminal contempt proceeding). Dictum
in the Court's 1949 decision in Wolf v. Colorado has been construed to say that the Fourth Amendment's protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to the states, though the case expressly held that the
exclusionary rule did not. 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949); see also Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
463 (1947) (plurality) (stating in dictum that the Fourteenth Amendment "would prohibit by its due process
clause execution by a state in a cruel manner").
35. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (Eighth Amendment excessive bail); Duncan v. Loui-
siana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968) (Sixth Amendment criminal jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,
22-23 (1967) (Sixth Amendment compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967)
(Sixth Amendment speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,407-08 (1965) (Sixth Amendment confrontation
clause); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, (1964) (Fourth Amendment warrant requirement); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) (Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 343 (1963) (Sixth Amendment assistance of counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962)
(Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961) (Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule).
36. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (Fifth Amendment double jeopardy applies to
states, despite Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)); Duncan, 391 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1968) (Sixth Amend-
ment jury trial right applies to states, despite Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900)); Malloy, 378 U.S. 1, 11
(1964) (Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to states, despite Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947), and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908)); Gideon, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in all criminal cases applies to states, despite Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942));
Mapp, 367 U.S. 643, 658-59 (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to states, despite Wolf, 338 U.S. 25).
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193137-exactly when is somewhat ambiguous. Freedom of assembly was ex-
plicitly incorporated in 1937, though this was rooted in the earlier speech cases.38
Similarly, the Free Exercise Clause was explicitly incorporated in 1940 in Cant-
well v. Connecticut,39 though the case for incorporation can be made as early as
192340 and, moreover, there were hints of free exercise concerns in the early
speech and press incorporation cases.41
The only arguable outlier was the Establishment Clause, which did lag
somewhat behind the rest, at least operationally. 42 The Supreme Court first ap-
plied the Establishment Clause to a state law in 1947,43 and struck down a state
law on Establishment Clause grounds the year after.44 This may have been the
real significance of the 1940 Cantwell decision, which declared that the "funda-
mental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties
guaranteed by the First Amendment" and that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress" to enact the
kinds of laws prohibited by both of the First Amendment's religion clauses.45
Cantwell's broad pronouncements not only shifted away from the language of
overlap and toward that of cross-reference but did so with reference to the First
Amendment as a single provision, rather than to any single clause, while at the
same time also referring explicitly to the Establishment Clause itself.46 While
free exercise incorporation, or something approaching it, had antecedents in the
37. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931);
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 382, 385, 387 (1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,371-72 (1927); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
38. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937) (invalidating conviction under state criminal
syndicalism statute as violating right of assembly); see also Whitney, 274 U.S. 357, 370-71; Fiske, 274 U.S. 380,
384-87. Cf Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263-64 (1937).
39. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
40. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923) (Fourteenth Amendment liberty "[w]ithout doubt"
includes such protections as the right "to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience"); see also
Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
41. Compare Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296 at 311 (striking down state licensing requirements applicable to re-
ligious solicitation and breach-of-the-peace conviction for playing audio recording produced by Jehovah's Wit-
nesses organization containing attacks on Roman Catholicism) with Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,450-
53 (1938) (striking down municipal licensing requirements for distributors of circulars, handbooks, advertising,
or literature in case involving distribution of Jehovah's Witness pamphlets and magazines); compare also Min-
ersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940) with W. va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
654 (1943).
42. Cf Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,254 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that compared with the Free Exercise Clause, incorporation of the Establishment Clause "has, however, come
later and by a route less easily charted"). The Petition Clause was not explicitly incorporated until Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 234 (1963), though this was likely because its role is significantly eclipsed by
freedom of speech, see Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 n.6 (1941), and perhaps also by a view that states
could not interfere with federal petition rights irrespective of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause,
see Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872); or even the Fourteenth Amendment itself, see Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325,337 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35,44 (1867)).
43. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 508 (1947).
44. See Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 466 (1948).
45. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
46. Id.
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early 1920s, Cantwell's broad dicta laid the groundwork for the later incorpora-
tion of the Establishment Clause, which was a less straightforward undertaking,
given its more contested historical basis47 and its propensity to attract political
controversy.48 At any rate, First Amendment incorporation took place within a
relatively compressed period of time and, with some caveats, can largely be
thought of as a unitary phenomenon.
II. THE CENTRALITY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Each of these three "incorporations" was significant to a degree, but in
terms of impact on the other two, it is First Amendment incorporation that proved
the most central to the constitutional story.
A. Takings Incorporation
Incorporation of Takings Clause protection largely stands apart from the
wider incorporation phenomenon. In 1978, the Supreme Court remarked that the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is "of course . . . made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment," citing its eighty-year-old decision
in the 1897 case of Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago.49 It has
largely become conventional wisdom that Chicago, Burlington was the case that
incorporated the Takings Clause,50 and thus the first incorporation case. In fact,
the Supreme Court had not previously treated Chicago, Burlington as an incor-
poration case in the cross-reference sense, although it undoubtedly established a
right that paralleled federal protection under the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause.51
47. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 309-10 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (accepting that "the Fourteenth
Amendment has somehow absorbed the Establishment Clause," but stating that the history of the adoption
"strongly suggestls]" that the Clause "was primarily an attempt to insure that Congress not only would be pow-
erless to establish a national church, but would also be unable to interfere with existing state establishments.");
see also id at 254 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It has been suggested, with some support in history, that absorption
of the First Amendment's ban against congressional legislation 'respecting an establishment of religion' is con-
ceptually impossible because the Framers meant the Establishment Clause also to foreclose any attempt by Con-
gress to disestablish the existing official state churches.").
48. Compare McCollum, 333 U.S. 203, at 211 with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 (1952). See
James E. Zucker, Better A Catholic Than A Communist: Reexamining McCollum v. Bd. of Ed. and Zorach v.
Clauson, 93 VA. L. REV. 2069, 2080 (2007); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962); Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 215-16 (1963); BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER: How ENGEL V. VITALE
CHANGED AMERICA 187-88 (2007); John Norton Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the
"Establishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEx. L. REV. 142, 144 n.1 1 (1963).
49. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978); Chicago, B. & Q R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
50. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 860 n.369 (1995) (Chicago, Burlington is the "standard citation" for Takings
incorporation).
51. Id. at 860.
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Actually, in terms of primacy, Chicago, Burlington is arguably one year
too late. As a formal matter, modern Takings doctrine entails two distinct pro-
tections:5 a requirement that a taking be for public use53 and a requirement to
provide just compensation for a taking,54 and a federal right that a state not take
private property for non-public use was first recognized in the Court's 1896 Mis-
souri Pacific decision.55 While that decision did not purport to make any portion
of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states, the requirement it imposed can
certainly be thought to coincide with the public use prong of takings doctrine.56
Nevertheless, its claim to be the first incorporation case is contestable. For one
thing, even prior cases applying a public use limitation to the federal govem-
ment-cases relied upon by Missouri Pacifc-did not trace that limitation to the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but rather to general principles of law. 57
At the time, in other words, the right against non-public takings was not linked
with the text of the Takings Clause.58 Second, the limitation does not seem to
have been associated with exercises of eminent domain in particular. Rather, the
public purpose requirement Missouri Pacific recognized was a relatively early
manifestation of a more general principle in federal constitutional doctrine that
government action must be public-regarding. 59 It therefore did not and frankly
could not serve as precedent that would have supported incorporation in its own
time. It could not even serve to dispel the inference later drawn in Hurtado v.
California that whatever else "due process" might entail, the one thing it did not
reach was the specific rights set out in the first eight amendments since due pro-
cess protection was itself one of those rights.60 Finally, it bears noting that the
"public use" limitation has been interpreted to have ver little bite today.61 At
most, therefore, the case stands as a formal progenitor6 of a rarely-successful
modem doctrine that it did not itself purport to apply.
But there is one important respect Missouri Pacific did have a larger impact
on the development of incorporation. The decision helped lay the foundations for
52. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231 (2003).
53. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005).
54. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 (1984).
55. See Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 416-17 (1896); see also Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Brad-
ley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896); cf Cole v. City of La Grange, 113 U.S. 1, 7 (1885) (interpreting state takings
provision to impose such a requirement). A claim for a still earlier application of the takings protection can be
made on the basis of Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, which, in the context of railroad rate regu-
lation, linked just compensation principle with the Equal Protection Clause. See 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894) ("The
equal protection of the laws which, by the Fourteenth Amendment, no State can deny to the individual, forbids
legislation, in whatever form it may be enacted, by which the property of one individual is, without compensation,
wrested from him for the benefit of another, or of the public.").
56. See Missouri Pac., 164 U.S. at 416-17.
57. See, e.g., Cole, 113 U.S. at 6-7; Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 662 (1874).
58. See cases cited supra note 55.
59. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, at 410-11 (1972).
60. See generally Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (describing the concept and history of "due
process")
61. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,479-80 (2005).
62. The case served as an authority in Cincinnati v. Vester, which declared it "well established that in
considering the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to cases of expropriation of private property, the ques-
tion what is a public use is a judicial one." 281 U.S. 439,446 (1930).
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important aspects in the development of constitutional law in the pre-New Deal
jurisprudence later associated with Lochner.63 This was true in both substance,
insofar as it lent force to the wider principle that state measures would be inval-
idated if they were insufficiently public-regarding, and in form, insofar as it rep-
resented a willingness to invalidate state action on grounds not clearly pertaining
simply to whether a person has been deprived of liberty or property "by the laws
of the State, a fair trial in a court of justice, according to the modes of proceeding
applicable to such a case," as the Court had earlier put it.64
The same can also be said of Chicago, Burlington, particularly with respect
to the non-procedural reading of due process.65 As it happens, Chicago, Burling-
ton was handed down the very same day as Allgeyer v. Louisiana,6 which held
that the word "liberty" used in the Due Process Clause extended to a much
broader range of individual rights than freedom from confinement, establishing
another critical piece in the development of what today would be regarded as
Lochnerian substantive due process.67 Allgeyer's reference to the "common oc-
cupations of life" and the "privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade"
represented a major curtailment, even repudiation, of the Slaughter-House
Cases,68 albeit under the heading of due process rather than privileges or immun-
ities.69 The quoted language was borrowed from Justice Bradley, one of the
Slaughter-house dissenters, and from Justice John Marshall Harlan, who au-
thored Chicago, Burlington and who would consistently advocate incorporation-
ist positions in the years to come.70
Apart from generally advancing principles that would lead to the expansion
of review of state law under the Due Process Clause, the Chicago, Burlington
decision would contribute to incorporation in one more direct way, by implicitly
sidestepping the interpretive logic of the Supreme Court's 1884 Hurtado deci-
sion.71 Hurtado had rejected the argument that the Due Process Clause required
indictment by grand jury, reasoning that the explicit articulation of such a right
in the Fifth Amendment precluded the possibility it could be considered a re-
quirement of due rocess, given that the Fifth Amendment contained its own Due
Process Clause.7 The implication was that specification in the Bill of Rights
precluded recognition under the Fourteenth Amendment.73 The Chicago, Bur-
63. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
64. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877).
65. See Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235 (1897).
66. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); id.
67. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 590.
68. Allgeyer essentially vindicated a position Justice Harlan had argued in dissent in a similar case two
years earlier. See Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69. See id at 589-91.
70. Allgeyer essentially vindicated a position Justice Harlan had argued in dissent in a similar case two
years earlier. See Hooper, 155 U.S. at 662-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 534-35 (1884).
72. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 520-21, 534-35
73. See id.
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lington decision laid a precedent hat would be invoked against the Hurtado doc-
trine years later.74 Chicago, Burlington's author Justice Harlan, had dissented in
Hurtado.?5
These dimensions of the takings cases are not entirely insignificant, but
their role in the larger incorporation story is fairly small. The Chicago, Burling-
ton decision made it easier to avoid the logic of Hurtado, but so too did the
Court's early free speech cases, which similarly ignored Hurtado without men-
tioning Chicago, Burlington or other Takings cases.76 And the Takings cases
certainly had no immediate effect on incorporation. Because they were at most a
matter of overlap and were not understood as making the Fifth Amendment itself
applicable to the states, their implications for further incorporation were limited.
Not surprisingly, they do not seem to have had much, if any effect on the incor-
poration of other constitutional protections.77 Recognition of federal speech and
press rights against state action did not occur until several decades later and was
not accomplished in any significant respect by relying on Chicago, Burlington
or its progeny.78 Indeed, whatever influence there may have been seems to have
run in the opposite direction: it was not until 1978 that the Court retrofitted its
earlier decisions into the general incorporation framework that governed in First
Amendment and criminal procedure cases.
Even apart from the question of larger influence on incorporation of other
constitutional rights, the impact of Takings incorporation never had an impact
comparable to incorporation of the First Amendment or the criminal procedure
rights. Chicago, Burlington broke relatively little new ground in its day.79 Every
state constitution contained provisions guaranteeing compensation for govern-
ment takings, which tended to ensure some amount of compensation in cases of
eminent domain, and the notion that a state measure restricting the permissible
uses of property could constitute a Fifth Amendment taking-what are today re-
ferred to as regulatory takings claims-did not begin to emerge until at least
1922.80 More generally, federal takings protection was less significant in the pre-
New Deal period because of the outright restrictions on state power over property
that developed under the Due Process Clause itself. And while Takings incorpo-
ration survived the New Deal transformation, the Takings Clause itself has pro-
vided relatively weak federal protection, "relegated to the status of a poor rela-
tion"1 among constitutional rights in the post-Carolene Products constitutional
order.82 In short, federal protection against states under the Takings Clause,
74. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932).
75. See Chicago, B. & Q., 166 U.S. at 226; Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. Thus, in Powell, the Court cited both Chicago, Burlington and three early free speech cases as authority
for avoiding the reasoning of Hurtado. 287 U.S. at 66.
77. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
78. See, e.g., id.
79. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 266 (1897).
80. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). It may have been that portions of the
opinion today understood as addressing the structure of Takings protection were actually meant to address due
process issues.
81. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
82. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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while significant, has not had anything like the impact of other incorporation
decisions and did little if anything to facilitate them.
B. Criminal Procedure Incorporation
Incorporation of the Constitution's criminal procedure provisions, the part
of the incorporation story that attracted the most controversy, simply did not oc-
cur until long after First Amendment incorporation was well established. Prior
to 1940, the Supreme Court intimated on four occasions that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected against state action along lines potentially echoing the
criminal procedure portions of the Bill of Rights, twice as holdings and twice as
dicta in cases upholding convictions. The first and most significant of these
cases, decided in 1932, involved a state criminal prosecution in which the Court
concluded the defendants were entitled as a matter of Due Process to court-ap-
pointed counsel.83 But the decision came several years before any recognition of
a right to court-appointed counsel applicable to the federal government under the
Sixth Amendment,84 it was hedged by numerous narrowing caveats in light of
circumstances of the case,85 and the Court would subsequently hold that there
was no general right to appointment of counsel in criminal prosecutions under
the Due Process Clause. At any rate, by the time it was decided, the Court had
already struck down state laws on First Amendment-type grounds on at least
three occasions,87 and the decision explicitly relied on its First Amendment prec-
edents in justifying its willingness to recognize a form of due process protection
resembling one of the rights set out in the first eight Amendments.88 In short, it
was not really an example of incorporation, and even if it were, it did not endure
and was the offspring, not the parent, of First Amendment incorporation.
Other due process criminal cases were similar. In 1936, the Court struck
down a conviction based on a coerced confession.89 Neither this case nor its
progeny recognized any connection to the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause, and, moreover, in 1947, the Court reaffirmed its earlier ruling90 that the
privilege against self-incrimination recognized in the Fifth Amendment was not
83. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67-68 (1932).
84. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
85. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71 (noting "the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the
circumstances of public hostility, the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by the military
forces, the fact that their friends and families were all in other states and communication with them necessarily
difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives" and reserving the question whether such
appointment would be necessary in other criminal prosecutions or other circumstances).
86. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (holding that "while want of counsel in a particular case
may result in a conviction lacking in .. . fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the Amendment embodies an
inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a
defendant who is not represented by counsel.").
87. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-69 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 735
(1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 384-87 (1927); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
88. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 67.
89. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936).
90. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1908).
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applicable to the states under the Fourteenth.9 1 In dicta, two other decisions re-
jecting constitutional claims by criminal defendants suggested that, in an appro-
priate case, some protection under the Fourteenth Amendment might be available
analogous to, respectively, Double Jeopardy and Confrontation Clause protec-
tion.9 Even if any of these cases are regarded as proto-incorporation cases, their
effect was meagre and secondary. Prior to 1940, starting with the first arguable
invalidation of a state law on free-speech grounds in 1927, the Court decided
eleven cases involving speech or press claims and sided with the challenger in
all but one.93
Moreover, although the Court's expressed theory in the First Amendment
cases left room for a different-and presumably more generous-standard than
that applied by the First Amendment to the federal government, there are no in-
stances in which the Court's analysis of the constitutionality of state laws di-
verged from its analysis under the First Amendment.94 If anything, its approach
toward states was more searching, not less.95 Certainly the Court brought First
Amendment protections to bear on a range of problems it had not confronted at
the federal level.96 It is also worth noting that early on the Court drew from both
First Amendment precedents and First Amendment history in reviewing state
regulation without any apparent hesitation.
97
In the criminal arena, by contrast, the Court continued to stress that it was
wedded to an overlap theory,98 and it explicitly curtailed earlier holdings in
which incorporation had been found. 9 The Court repeatedly emphasized the nar-
rowness and fact-bound nature of its holdings. Through the end of the 1950s, the
91. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51-52, 85 (1947).
92. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,328 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934).
93. See Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-06
(1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 526
(1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1938); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293
U.S. 245,262 (1934) (siding against the challenger); Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 269-70; Near, 283 U.S. 697 at 722-
23; Fiske, 274 U.S. at 387. Whitney v. California, decided the same day as Fiske, would make a twelfth case, and
a third in which the free speech claim failed. 274 U.S. 357, 371-72 (1927). It must be acknowledged that the
posture of the cases complicates their clear categorization in some instances. This is especially so in Hague, in
which at least two justices invoked a privileges or immunities rationale. See Hague, 307 at 501-32.
94. The 1940s marked a period of some retrenchment for both First Amendment and criminal procedure
claims. On the First Amendment side, this included Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (licensing
fees); Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
(fighting words); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (time, place, and manner restrictions). For crim-
inal procedure, this included Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)
(limiting right to counsel articulated in Powell). For the First Amendment arena, however, there is no reason to
think these were limitations applicable only to states, and the Court did continue to find a variety of restrictions
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943)
(limiting Opelika). The criminal procedure decisions explicitly narrowed protections against states.
95. The first decision of the Supreme Court to invalidate a federal statute under the First Amendment's
Speech or Press Clauses was Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965).
96. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
98. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-35 (1937).
99. See Betts, 316 U.S. at 471-72 (1942); see also Adamson, 332 U.S. at 66-67.
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Court did suggest some overlap between the Due Process Clause and the enu-
merated criminal procedure rights in a few additional areas, sometimes in hold-
ings and sometimes in dicta, sometimes noting the Bill of Rights arallel and
sometimes not, and often describing its reasoning quite cryptically.' 0 The Court
did not, however, suggest that the scope of protection under the Due Process
Clause was identical to that of any clause or provision of the first eight amend-
ments.101 These decisions were not especially remarkable: the Court intervened
in state criminal matters on a number of occasions on the basis of the Due Process
Clause, and the cases involving potential overlap with Bill of Rights protection
were a decided minority and were supported by the same basic framework of
legal analysis applicable in due process cases generally.102 The pace of invalida-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment increased from the 1930s onward, but not
at a rate comparable to the Court's First Amendment docket and with nothing
like the gusto and confidence of its First Amendment decisions.
The incorporation of the criminal procedure protections began in earnest
with the Court's 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio,' 3 which not only subjected
states to the exclusionary rule regime applicable to federal searches and seizures,
but also laid to rest the suggestion that the states would be subject to a more
lenient standard than their federal counterparts in terms of the actual standard of
conduct government agents must follow. 4 (Even then, however, one member
of the Court concurred in the result only because he believed the statute under
which the prosecution proceeded violated First Amendment rights.) 05 While the
scope of First Amendment protection would continue to expand throughout the
1960s and beyond, incorporation was a well-established part of the landscape by
the time Mapp was handed down.
100. See generally Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948); Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459,463 (1947) (plurality); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). Wolf v. Colorado rejected a challenge to conviction
based on claim of unreasonable search and seizure, but remarked in the course of doing so that "security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a
free society" and therefore enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause. 338 U.S. 25, 27-28
(1949); cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (stating that conduct of police "shocks the conscience"
where they were involved in "[i]llegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth
and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's content.").
101. Chandler v. Fretag, however, announced a seemingly absolute right to confer with counsel, 348 U.S.
3, 10 (1954), notwithstanding the limitations discussed in Betts v. Brady, on a right to appointed counsel under
Powell v. Alabama. 287 U.S. 45, 10 (1932); Betts, 316 U.S. at 463-65.
102. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (knowing use of false testimony); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927) (right to impartial judge); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-dominated trial).
The Court also restricted criminal procedure under other constitutional provisions, particularly under the Equal
Protection Clause in response to racial concerns. This, too, however, could find support in the pre-New Deal
Court, going back to early years of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Strauder v. west Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1879).
103. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
104. See id. at 655 (reasoning that "[s]ince the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them
by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government."). If there is conceivably a sliver
of ambiguity in this statement by virtue of its citation to Wolf, it was fully resolved soon afterward in Ker v.
California. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, at 30 n.7 (1963).
105. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 672 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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III. FIRST AMENDMENT INCORPORATION AND THE LOCHNER CONNECTION
The question, then, is where First Amendment incorporation came from,
and since there was little preexisting First Amendment doctrine to incorporate-
the Supreme Court would not actually hold a federal statute invalid under the
Speech or Press Clauses until 1965106-the question is to some extent a matter
of the origins of the modern First Amendment itself. The discussion that follows
does not seek to explore subjective motivations of the various justices on the
Court in any comprehensive way or to uncover deeper intellectual, social, or
other influences on their decision-making. The focus is instead on doctrinal and
to some extent thematic roots in the development of First Amendment incorpo-
ration.
Two cases will help set the stage. The first of these, decided in 1922, in-
volved a challenge to a Missouri statute that required corporations licensed to do
business in the state to provide any former employee a written statement of the
reason for the employee's departure.107 "Service letter" statutes like Missouri's
had been enacted in several states in the early Twentieth Century, partly in re-
sponse to concerns about businesses blacklisting their former employees,
whether out of a desire to restrict labor market competition generally or to pre-
vent union organization and membership more specifically.10 Robert Cheek had
worked as a life insurance agent for Prudential Insurance, but left the company
for family reasons, and when the company refused his request for a letter pursu-
ant to the statute, Cheek sued. 109 Three state supreme courts had previously de-
clared their own states' service statutes unconstitutional under free speech pro-
visions in their respective state constitutions, articulating what would today be
viewed as compelled speech theories." 0 "Liberty of speech and of writing is
secured by the Constitution, and incident thereto is the correlative liberty of si-
lence, not less important nor less sacred," as one court put it, and the use of "stat-
utory terror" to compel the provision of reference letters "is not allowable where
rights are under the guardianship of due process of law."" Prudential's brief
quoted extensively from these arguments in support of its contention that the
Missouri statute invaded the company's Fourteenth Amendment liberties, partic-
ularly that of contract.1 2
106. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
107. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 530-32 (1922).
108. See Harold Friedman & Sam G. Hopkins, An Analysis of the Missouri Service Letter Statute, 21 U.
KAN. CrrY L. REV. 102, 102 (1952); Creath S. Thorne, Missouri's Service Letter Statute: Its Reach, Effect, and
Constitutionality, 52 UMKC L. REV. 641, 641-43 (1984).
109. Cheek, 259 U.S. at 531.
110. See St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Griffin, 171 S.W. 703, 707 (Tex. 1914); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co v. Brown, 102 P. 459, 461 (Kan. 1909); Wallace v. Georgia, C. & N. Ry. Co., 22 S.E. 579, 579 (Ga.
1894). A similar challenge was upheld in federal district court under modern free speech doctrine, but later re-
versed on appeal. See Rimmer v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 495 F. Supp. 1217, 1228 (W.D. Mo. 1980), rev'd,
656 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1981).
111. Griffin, 171 S.W. 705; Wallace, 22 S.E. at 579.
112. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error, at 31-41, Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. V. Perry, 259 U.S. 548
(1922).
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The Supreme Court in Prudential Insurance v. Cheek rejected the challenge
by a vote of six to three.113 Writing for the majority, Justice Mahlon Pitney dis-
tinguished the three state supreme court cases invalidating service letter statutes
on the ground that they were construing their own state constitutions.11 4 "[N]ei-
ther the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution of
the United States," he declared, "imposes upon the States any restrictions about
'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of silence,' nor, we may add, does it confer
any right of privacy upon either persons or corporations." 5 Pitney's decision
was joined by Justices McKenna, Holmes, Day, Brandeis, and Clarke. Chief Jus-
tice Taft, Justice Van Devanter, and Justice McReynolds dissented without opin-
ion.116
The second decision to frame this discussion, decided fifteen years later,
arose in a somewhat related context. Morris Watson, an "earnest, thin-
thatched""7 reporter and editor with the Associated Press had been fired for what
his employer said was unsatisfactory job performance. Watson, however, was a
dedicated labor organizer and vice president in the American Newspaper Guild,
the leading labor union for newspaper journalists, and he alleged that his dismis-
sal was actually driven by his union activities, in violation of the newly-enacted
Wagner Act." 1 A complaint was filed with the National Labor Relations Board,
which found in Watson's favor and ordered his reinstatement.119 The Associated
Press challenged the constitutionality of the Act on First Amendment grounds,
among others. The Supreme Court rebuffed the challenge, however, by a five-
to-four vote in Associated Press v. NLRB 120-one of the companions to the more
famous decision in Jones & Laughlin Steel, handed down the same day.12' In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Owen Roberts declared that the freedom of the
press did not give the AP immunity from general laws, and the AP was free under
113. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
114. Id. at 538-43.
115. Id. at 543.
116. Dissents were less common at the time the decision was rendered than today, with nearly 78 percent
of all decisions during the 1922 term being unanimous and dissenting votes comprising just 6 percent of all votes
cast by members of the Supreme Court in merits cases. This analysis is based on records from The Supreme Court
Database, WASH. U. L., http://www.scdb.wustl.edu (last visited Aug. 14, 2020). At least one contemporary com-
mentator concluded that the holding in Cheek was justified only on the grounds that it was applied to an out-of-
state corporation not admitted to do business at the time of enactment and that it would be "clearly unconstitu-
tional" to apply such a law to a natural person. See Nelson Phillips Jr., Note, Constitutionality of Service Letter
Laws, 9 vA. L. REv. 292, 295 (1922-23).
117. AP v. Guild, TIME (June 29, 1936).
118. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 123 (1937).
119. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 124.
120. Id. at 133.
121. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also Washington, va. & Md. Coach
Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB
v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937). These decisions closely followed the decision in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389, 400 (1937), upholding Washington state's minimum wage law for women, and
only slightly preceded the decisions in the Social Security Act cases, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937);
Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301
U.S. 495 (1937).
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the Wagner Act to dismiss an employee who was incompetent or threatened its
policy of editorial impartiality.12 2
Justice George Sutherland dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Van
Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler.123 These were the justices referred to as the
Four Horsemen because of their opposition to various New Deal measures and
other Progressive legislation.124 In his opinion for the four dissenters, Sutherland
first noted that the federal government was restricted not only by the First
Amendment but by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and he as-
serted that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause itself would have pro-
tected the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, although the text of the
First Amendment made clear that the rights it specified were unqualified in a
way that other rights like "liberty of contract" were not.125 This was altogether
fitting, he argued, for the "stern and often bloody struggles" by which the rights
protected by the First Amendment were secured made it clear that vigilance was
needed to protect against even the slightest infringement, a position reinforced
with a quotation from Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States.12
6
"Freedom," Sutherland continued, "is not a mere intellectual abstraction; and it
is not merely a word to adorn an oration upon occasions of patriotic rejoicing." 2 7
Protection for First Amendment rights had to be understood in light of the con-
tent of the rights and the practical context in which they were to be applied, and
where the Wagner Act's application to a newsgathering organization was con-
cerned, pre-textual firing was beside the point. 2 In Sutherland's view, the AP
had a constitutional right not to employ any person as an editor who was engaged
in union organization, given that labor itself was a major political issue. 129 No
one, Sutherland supposed, would doubt that a union that published a pro-labor
journal would be constitutionally entitled to fire an editor who ceased to believe
in the union cause and resigned union membership, and by parity of reasoning,
the AP could not be required to employ reporters and editors who took a leader-
ship role in the union. 0
Sutherland hit on what would prove an enduring tension in First Amend-
ment doctrine. The majority's insistence that freedom of the press does not entail
an exemption from generally applicable law draws on deep intuitions and con-
tinues to play a critical role in the structure of First Amendment doctrine.13' But
the application of formally neutral rules to the activities covered by the First
Amendment is not always accepted, even in the absence of indications of unequal
122. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132.
123. Id at 133.
124. See Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 243 (1996) (book
review).
125. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 135 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 135-36 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
127. Id at 137.
128. Id at 137-38.
129. Id
130. Id at 140.
131. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 644,685 (1972); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,577 (1941).
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application or illicit governmental motive.132 The speech-protective standard for
sedition and incitement that is the foundation of so much First Amendment doc-
trine, both theoretically and historically, can itself be seen as a narrowing of gen-
erally applicable principles of criminal and civil liability based on causation and
imminence. And where the First Amendment is concerned, laws affecting organ-
izational participation and membership seem to trigger particular constitutional
solicitude.133 Of course, the distinction Sutherland evidently would have drawn
between union leadership and mere union membership was, to put it mildly, un-
der-theorized, and it is unclear how he envisioned a newspaper union being struc-
tured. More generally, one might accuse Sutherland and his fellow horsemen of
First Amendment Lochnering-not by some latter-day analogy but as the real-
live villains in the constitutional melodrama of the Lochnerian Supreme
Court.134
But although Sutherland represented the Old Court and although his posi-
tion in AP reflected an attack on the New Deal economic legislation, his dissent
is remarkable in several decidedly forward-looking respects: its position that
First Amendment guarantees occupy a preferred position in the scheme of con-
stitutional rights, its apparent endorsement of some sort of absolutism in the ap-
plication of these rights, its willingness to override general laws applicable to
expressive and non-expressive conduct alike, its citations to history and use of
soaring rhetoric of civil liberties, and its unequivocal assertion (unnecessary to
decide the case) that First Amendment freedoms were fully protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment.135 This was a First Amendment opinion in the modern
style, reflecting many of the core features of what would become, and remains,
governing First Amendment doctrine.
Presented with only these two cases-Cheek in 1922 and AP in 1937-one
might well conclude that the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press in
their early years were primarily concerns of the Supreme Court's old guard, who
were either brash, visionary, or stubborn in championing these civil liberties as
a matter of constitutional due process interpretation. That would not be an accu-
rate take on the larger picture of First Amendment development during this pe-
riod, but what is true is that pre-Lochner jurisprudence does appear to have been
essential to the emergence of modern free speech law and thus to the origins of
the incorporation doctrine.
132. Cf Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 602-03 (Stone, J., dissenting).
133. Compare Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp't Opportunity
Comm'n, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) with Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See
also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 580 (1995); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 623 (1984). It is interesting in this regard to compare Associated Press v. NLRB,
301 U.S. 103 with International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 243-46 (1918), which held that
non-member competitors were not entitled to reprint AP reporting, and Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945), which found that AP's by-laws limiting membership violated the Sherman Antitrust Act,
rejecting a First Amendment challenge not because the Sherman Act is a speech neutral general law but because
the statute's pro-competitive aims were considered consistent with free speech guarantees.
134. Lochner itself was decided in 1905, before any of the horsemen had joined the Coust.
135. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 134.
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Before going further, we should understand what the landscape looked like
in the years preceding Cheek. Despite hundreds of Fourteenth Amendment deci-
sions handed down in the pre-New Deal period, the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with only a handful of cases presenting the possibility that a state had
infringed the sorts of rights protected by the First Amendment. The 1873 opinion
in the Slaughter-House Cases had declared cryptically that the "privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States" protected from state abridgment by the
Fourteenth Amendment included the right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances,136 and the opinion United States v. Cruikshank three years
later had elaborated on this theme, adding that such rights are implied by "[t]he
very idea of a government, republican in form." 137 Cruikshank strongly hinted,
however, that these protections were limited to rights of assembly and petition
only to the extent they concerned federal action and policy.138 On such a reading,
the Privileges or Immunities Clause had extended these First Amendment guar-
antees to the states in a way, but only as a kind of derivative protection that barred
states from interfering with the exercise of rights originating in an individual
citizen's relationship to the federal government.
It was not until 1897, two decades after Cruikshank, that the Court was first
presented squarely with a Fourteenth Amendment claim that entailed First
Amendment-type rights against state action. The case involved the prosecution
of one William F. Davis, a charismatic and, it is safe to say, unyielding evangel-
ical preacher, described by the New York Times as a "crank," if a well-inten-
tioned one.139 The indictment against Davis charged him with making a public
address on Boston Common without a permit, in violation of a city ordinance.
140
The occasion for his arrest, by no means his first,1 41 was a sermon preached to a
crowd of upwards of two hundred people on a Sunday morning in June. The
officer who arrested him conceded that there was "no disorder or disturbance,"
and Davis asserted that the permitting ordinance he was charged with violating
had been adopted out of hostility to fervent denunciations of liquor in sermons
that he and others preached. 142 This was not implausible, and it was bound up in
larger religious and social tensions in Boston during the period.1
43 By the time
of his arrest, Davis had become one of the "standard bearers for the evangelical
Protestant minority in a city populated, and increasingly governed, by a Roman
Catholic majority."144
136. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79-79 (1873).
137. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876).
138. Id
139. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 46 (1897).
140. Id at 47.
141. Davis noted his various arrests and imprisonments in class reports to his fellow Harvard alumni. See
William Franklin Davis, in 10 HARVARD COLLEGE CLASS OF 1867 SECRETARY'S REPORT, 22 (1897).
142. See MARGARET LAMBERTS BENDROTH, FUNDAMENTALISTS IN THE CITY: CONFLICT AND DIVISION IN
BOSTON'S CHURCHES, 1885-1950, 53 (2005); william E. Lee, Modernizing the Law of Open-Air Speech: The
Hughes Court and the Birth of Content-Neutral Balancing, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1219, 1230-32 (2005).
143. BENDROTH,supra note 142,at41-55.
144. Id at 47.
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Davis's case first reached Massachusetts's Supreme Judicial Court, where
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected his claims with dispatch.145 Though un-
doubtedly aware of the context of Davis's prosecution and the wider social dy-
namics that gave rise to it, Holmes declared that there was no reason to think the
ordinance was intended to target open-air preaching. 146 It is not clear that it
would have mattered if there had been. On Holmes's view, a state statute that
restricted or even altogether banned public speaking in a highway or public park
"is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the
owner of a private house to forbid it in his house."147 At the U.S. Supreme Court,
a unanimous court in Davis v. Massachusetts essentially adopted the same
greater-power-includes-the-lesser rationale, making no mention of freedom of
speech. 48 The case was argued just weeks after Allgeyer and Chicago, Burling-
ton were handed down, but the Davis Court was unwilling to conclude that the
Fourteenth Amendment restricted the state's police powers in substantive
terms.149
It would be another decade before the Court faced another First Amend-
ment-type claim. In 1907, the Court was asked to overturn a conviction for crim-
inal contempt in Patterson v. Colorado.150 Thomas M. Patterson-populist
Democrat, sitting U.S. Senator, and publisher of the Rocky Mountain News and
the Denver Times-had printed editorials and cartoons in his newspapers critical
of recent decisions by the Colorado Supreme Court.151 He accused various jus-
tices of being controlled by Republican and corporate interests, having issued a
ruling setting aside various local elections on the seemingly extraordinary theory
that the constitutional amendment permitting them was itself unconstitutional.1) 2
The Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court promptly moved to have Pat-
terson prosecuted for criminal contempt, a charge for which truth was not a de-
fense, in contrast to Colorado libel law, and Patterson was duly convicted.153
Reviewing the Colorado proceedings, by-then-Supreme Court Justice Holmes
declared it unnecessary to decide "whether there is to be found in the Fourteenth
145. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895) (Holmes, J.)
146. Id
147. Id Holmes cited as authority his own opinion in McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, which declared that
one may have "a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." N.E.
517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
148. See 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897) ("The right to absolutely exclude all right to use necessarily includes the
authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be availed of, as the greater power contains the
lesser.").
149. Id at 47; see Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897 (1897); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 (1897).
150. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1907). The same term, the Court also decided Halter v.
Nebraska, which upheld a ban on use of the American flag in beer advertising. 205 U.S. 34, 45 (1907).
151. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 458-59; Patterson, Thomas M., OUR CAMPAIGNS, https://www.ourcam-
paigns.com/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=121964 (last visited Aug. 14, 2020).
152. See Patterson, 205 U.S. at 459-60; see also People ex rel Miller v. Johnson, 86 P. 233, 239 (Colo.
1905), overruled in part by People ex rel Attorney Gen. v. Curtice, 117 P. 357 (Colo. 1911). The amendment,
providing for home rule, had been adopted in 1902 in part due to Patterson's agitation. See LUCAS A. POwE JR.,
THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 2 (1991).
153. See People ex rel Attorney Gen. v. News-Times Publ'g. Co., 84 P. 912, 956 (Colo. 1906).
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Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the First," since the "main purpose
of such provisions" was simply to bar prior restraints and, moreover, the power
to prevent statements during the pendency of trial was necessary to prevent "in-
terference with the course of justice."'54 And while Patterson pointed to the ob-
vious conflict of interest in a case involving personal criticism of the very justices
who convicted him, Holmes responded that the grounds for contempt are "im-
personal" and that it would be perverse to hold that one who interferes with a
judicial proceeding can claim exemption from punishment by making personal
criticisms of the tribunal's judges.' As in Davis, Holmes dealt in the broadest
generalities about the scope of constitutional protection, reviewed the challenged
legal regime in its most abstract form, and suggested its complete immunity from
any free speech challenge.156
This time the Court's decision did provoke a dissent. Justice Harlan argued
that Fourteenth Amendment did protect freedom of speech and press, by virtue
of both the Privileges or Immunities and the Due Process Clauses.'5 1 The First
Amendment established those rights as "attributes of national citizenship," and
therefore they were among the Privileges or Immunities protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.158 They were additionally protected by the Due Process
Clause because they "constitute essential parts of every man's liberty" and it was
"impossible to conceive of liberty" secured against hostile action by the states
which does not include speech and press rights.159 That being so, he concluded,
a state could not permissibly infringe those rights "whenever it thinks that the
public welfare requires that to be done," whether by legislative enactments or
judicial action.160 Beyond this and his rejection of Holmes's suggestion that the
only possible constitutional protection would be against prior restraints, Harlan
did not further explain why this particular conviction was unconstitutional.'6'
In 1915, the Court again rejected a freedom of speech claim, this time in-
volving prosecution under a state statute punishing the publication or distribution
of any "written or printed matter" having "a tendency to encourage or incite the
commission of any crime, breach of the peace, or act of violence, or which shall
tend to encourage or advocate disrespect for law or for any court or courts of
justice."162 The defendant in Fox v. Washington had been convicted on the basis
of an essay entitled "The Nude and the Prudes," which advocated a boycott
against certain members of an anarchist commune for having had other members
154. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462-63.
155. Id. at 463.
156. Id at 461-63.
157. Id at 464 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
158. Id at 464-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
159. Id at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 464-65 (Harlan, J, dissenting). Justice David Brewer also dissented, concluding that the
Court at least had jurisdiction to hear the claim. See id at 465-66 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
162. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 275 (1915). The Court also rejected a free speech claim under the
Ohio Constitution, concluding that films were unprotected. See Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236
U.S. 230, 243-45 (1915).
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of the commune prosecuted for swimming in the nude.163 Holmes concluded that
the essay "unmistakably" encourages further violations of the state's indecent
exposure laws.164 Holmes determined that the statute had thus far been construed
to reach only publications encouraging actual breach of the law, and would not
likely be extended to those that merely "tend to produce unfavorable opinions of
a particular statute or of law in general."165 The latter, he implied, would be of
at least "doubtful" constitutionality, though he seemed to suggest more on
grounds of vagueness than freedom of speech. 166 There was no dissent, no dis-
cussion of the First Amendment, and no reference to freedom of speech apart
from a statement that the state supreme court found that the Constitution of the
United States guarantees freedom of speech but that there had been no viola-
tion. 167 Harlan had left the Court four years earlier, replaced by Mahlon Pitney,
the eventual author of Cheek.
In 1920, incorporation came into slightly crisper focus in Gilbert v. Minne-
sota.168 There the Court was faced with a state statute criminalizing draft inter-
ference that had been used to prosecute a man for a speech asserting that Amer-
ican conscription was democratically illegitimate.1 69 This was the first time the
Court had faced a challenge to a state law during the era of the so-called "Red
Scare."170 The Court had confronted seditious speech at the federal level (includ-
ing Abrams v. United States,171 which signaled a turning point in Holmes' and
Brandeis' approach to speech issues), but it is equally important to note that the
Court sustained the convictions in every one of the cases that reached it-indeed,
it would not strike down a federal law on free speech grounds until the mid-
1960s.172 The result in Gilbert was similar, both to the sedition cases and its
earlier incorporation cases, avoiding the incorporation issue by rejecting the
claim on the merits. 173 Notable for our purposes, Brandeis dissented. He princi-
pally maintained that the law invaded the federal government's exclusive pre-
rogative, which he argued included an important free speech element. 174 At the
end of his dissent, however, he also added that while he would not decide
whether the Fourteenth Amendment applied, he could not believe "that the lib-
erty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty to acquire
and to enjoy property."175
And so things stood at the time Cheek was handed down. Cheek thus
seemed at long last to close the door that the earlier cases had left open. And
163. Fox, 236 U.S. at 277.
164. Id at 277.
165. Id
166. Id
167. See id.
168. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
169. Id at 326-27.
170. Id. at 327-28.
171. 250 U.S. 616, 623 (1919).
172. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 306 (1965).
173. See Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 333.
174. Id at 337 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
175. Id at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
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while Holmes and Brandeis had voiced support for speech rights, it was perfectly
plausible to conclude that in Cheek, Brandeis-who had gone so far as to argue
for repeal of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to end Lochnerian due process
and equal protection constraints-had ultimately decided it was best not to add
any fuel to the Fourteenth Amendment fire. 176 Yet by the time of the AP v. NLRB
decision, the ideas he first began to articulate in Gilbert had become law, with
support from across the Court.177
Much, of course, had happened in the years between. One critical develop-
ment occurred during the term immediately following Cheek. In Meyer v. Ne-
braska,178 the Court was presented with a challenge to a Nebraska statute forbid-
ding any school teacher to instruct a child in a foreign language.179 The measure
had been adopted in 1919, motivated largely by anti-German sentiment in the
wake of the First World War, and especially by antipathy to Lutheran churches,
where services were conducted in German.'80 Robert Meyer, an instructor at a
Lutheran school, was arrested after being observed by state authorities teaching
the story of Jacob's Ladder to a ten-year-old boy during a school recess period.18
He challenged his conviction on a number of grounds, but in arguments to the
U.S. Supreme Court, he primarily stressed the right to pursue a vocation, which
had been the conceptual foundation for the Court's liberty-of-contract jurispru-
dence under the Fourteenth Amendment.182 It was also argued that the statute
infringed rights of property in private schools and that it violated equal protection
by drawing arbitrary classifications-for example, because it did not extend to
instruction in foreign languages at home or by tutors.183 In short, the Court had
before it numerous orthodox doctrinal routes to the conclusion that the act was
unconstitutional.
At oral argument, however, the discussion took a somewhat different
course. Arthur Mullen, Meyer's counsel, laid primary stress on "liberty of con-
science" and "religious liberty," which he maintained were protected against
state incursion by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause. 184 Chief Justice Taft pressed Mullen for clarification about doctrinal me-
chanics, asking him whether it was his position that the "liberty" protected by
the Due Process Clause "includes in that 'liberty' the free exercise of reli-
gion." 185 Mullen assented. Taft followed up: "You incorporate that into that pro-
176. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 548 (1922).
177. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 137 (1937).
178. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397-98 (1923).
179. The companion case, which includes Holmes's brief dissent, is Bartels v. Iowa. 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
180. william G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 U. CINN. L. REV.
125, 132 (1988).
181. Id at 146 n.110.
182. Id at 173.
183. Id at 156-57, 169.
184. Id at 170-71.
185. Id at 171.
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vision?" Mullen replied with an emphatic yes, adding that "surely, religious lib-
erty is a privilege and immunity guaranteed by our Constitution."'86 Taft then
inquired if free speech was also protected, to which Mullen replied that not only
was free speech protected, but also "the right to study, and the right to use the
human intellect as man sees fit."1 87
It is difficult to know exactly what Taft and Mullen each meant or what
thoughts their comments would have provoked in the minds of other members
of the Court, but the colloquy does shed some light on the considerations that
were in play. Taft's comments suggest that the idea of substantive overlap be-
tween the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause was within the bounds
of contemplation, though his use of the word "incorporate" does not necessarily
imply that he was thinking in terms of a cross-reference theory, or even an ap-
proach in which protection afforded against federal and state action operated
identically.188 Mullen's insistent Privileges or Immunities argument indicates
that the idea of relying on the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect against
state action was still kicking around, 9 but it is unclear whether he was referring
to protections of the First Amendment as such or more generally to rights the
First Amendment itself might be said to incorporate or operationalize.
At any rate, the final result in Meyer was that the Court did indeed find the
law unconstitutional, in an opinion by Justice McReynolds, a man whose parsi-
moniousness of spirit toward humanity merits an entire chapter in the general
legend of the Four Horsemen.19 0 Yet while McReynolds certainly could have
confined himself to a theory grounded in rights of property, contractual freedom,
or protection from what was called class legislation, hewing to the major doc-
trines of the period, he did not do so.191
The liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, he began, had not been
defined in the Court's cases with exactness-and, he implied, it would remain
open-ended-but it indisputably entailed a number of more particular guaran-
tees, which he proceeded to name.192 His list included not only such Lochnerian
staples as the rights to contract and to engage in common callings, but also the
rights "to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of [one's] own conscience,
and, generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as es-
sential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 193 This was a strong,
sweeping statement hat touched on virtually every possible interest that had been
invoked in opposition to the statute. McReynolds cited fourteen cases for this
proposition, not one of which dealt with anything like these latter rights, or even
186. Id
187. Id at 172.
188. Id at 171-72.
189. A fact in some sense confirmed by Hague. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,517 (1939).
190. See Barry Cushman, Clerkingfor Scrooge, 70 U. CHi. L. REv. 721, 721-26 (2003).
191. See Ross, supra note 180, at 180-81.
192. Id at 181.
193. Id
1527No. 5]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
mentioned them as dicta.194 Apart from general assertions that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects "fundamental" rights, that the rights of petition and assem-
bly are, as Slaughter-House had said, privileges and immunities of national citi-
zenship, and that liberty under the Due Process Clause includes "the right of the
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties" and "to be free to use them
in all lawful ways," the uniform thread through those cases was recognition of
Fourteenth Amendment protection of the right to earn one's livelihood by any
lawful calling.195 That principle would have been sufficient to decide the case,
but McReynolds went well beyond it.
And the rest of his argument was curious too. The legislation would be
invalid if it was "arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the State to effect."196 McReynolds readily conceded the le-
gitimacy of the state's interests in adopting its ban on language instruction. 197
Even so, he wrote, "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
respected," and "a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means."198
He concluded the legislation was indeed arbitrary and irrational, but in terms that
suggest the problem had more to do with the clash with fundamental rights than
with the measure's efficacy.199 Nowhere did McReynolds explain why the statute
was arbitrary and irrational, and it would have been difficult to show that it was.
(Holmes, joined by Sutherland, dissented on precisely this ground.)2 00 McReyn-
olds intimated that the measure might be justified in time of war or emergency,
but that hardly implied it lacked rationality in any other situation.20 1 One could
readily imagine that the interests that would support such a restriction for war-
making or defense purposes could also be said to support its extension to peace-
time-for example, the concern expressed by the state that many World War I
conscripts lacked English fluency. Nor did he explain why the measure could not
be considered a reasonable means of furthering interests in promoting English
fluency and in facilitating cultural assimilation more generally.202 Indeed, he
conceded that it might be "highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of
our ordinary speech," but even so, "this cannot be coerced by methods which
conflict with the Constitution."203 We cannot know what, precisely McReynolds
was thinking-if indeed he was thinking precisely-but that is beside the point.
Meyer's ruling that the Nebraska measure was arbitrary suggested something
much more like a view grounded in individual rights that narrow the state's po-
lice power than one concerned merely with policing reasonableness, vested
rights, or legislative favoritism. This was in keeping with some of the Court's
more aggressive Due Process decisions, like those invalidating wage regulation,
194. Reynolds provided no pin-cites and did not refer to any concurrences or dissents. Id at 181-82.
195. See Allgeyer v. Lousiana, 65 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
196. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 400-01.
197. Id at 398.
198. Id at 401.
199. Id at 400-01.
200. See Ross, supra note 180 at 183-85; see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01, 403.
201. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402-03.
202. See id at 400-03.
203. Id at 401.
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but it was in serious tension with traditional doctrinal statements that Due Pro-
cess restrictions did not affect the state's legitimate police power and that state
legislation was entitled to great deference.2 4 Meyer, in other words, had taken
hold of the strongest treatment in the Lochnerian medicine chest and applied it
in a case recognizing a slew of rights closely related to those named in the First
Amendment.
Meyer received an encore two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,205
a case invalidating what was effectively a ban on private schools and which had
an even more evident religious aspect than the measure challenged in Meyer.206
Again, the Court's opinion was authored by McReynolds, and this time it was
unanimous, characterized by the same view of fundamental rights that limit the
state's police power.207 But the more significant development in the Spring of
1925 came one week later, when the Court handed down its decision in Gitlow
v. New York.208 The case involved a challenge to the conviction of one Benjamin
Gitlow, a socialist and former member of the New York State Assembly, under
a state "criminal anarchy" statute, which forbade advocacy of the overthrow of
organized government by force, violence, or any unlawful means.209 Gitlow had
been prosecuted for his role in bringing forth "Left Wing Manifesto," which had
been printed in The Revolutionary Age, a newspaper he helped publish.2 10 Git-
low's conviction was sustained, but in his opinion for the majority, Justice Ed-
ward Terry Sanford did not rest upon Cheek's seemingly forceful rejection of
free speech protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.211 Rather, he wrote,
"we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press-which are
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among
the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."212 Sanford
declared that Cheek's "incidental" statement would not be regarded as determi-
native, and he cited a string of precedents in support, none of which contradicted
204. See id. at 125-26.
205. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
206. The legislation attacked in Pierce was the subject of an amicus brief in Meyer, which likened the
measure to the Soviet Union. Brief for william D. Guthrie & Bernard Hershkopff as Amici Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff in Error, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1932) (need docket number here).
207. The legislation was defective, McReynolds wrote, because it unreasonably interfered with parental
liberty to control their children's upbringing and education-under what he called the fundamental theory of
liberty supporting all American government, a child is "not the mere creature of the State." Pierce, 268 U.S. at
535. Having said this, McReynolds's opinion then invoked the property rights of the schools, presumably because
they, not parents, were the parties in the case, and corporations had been held to possess only property, not liberty,
rights under the Due Process Clause, and thus the property argument essentially served as a way to invoke third-
party rights. Id. at 532-36.
208. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
209. Id at 654.
210. Id at 655.
211. Id at 670.
212. Id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Cheek's declaration213and some of which had no obvious connection to the ques-
tion at all.2 14
The majority upheld Gitlow's conviction, however, reasoning that the leg-
islature could well have concluded that statements advocating the overthrow of
the government by unlawful means could be punishable as a class, without regard
to whether they were dangerous in any particular case.215 Justice Holmes, joined
by Brandeis, dissented, and took no issue with the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the case.2 16 "The general principle of free speech," he wrote,
"must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope
that has been given to the word 'liberty' as there used," though he added that it
might "perhaps" be accepted with a "somewhat larger latitude of interpretation"
that the restrictions imposed on the national government by the First Amend-
ment.217
What had changed since Cheek? For one thing, there was the doctrine laid
down in Meyer and extended in Pierce, as well as the experience of working
through the problems those cases presented.2 18 Another was the Court's compo-
sition. In the three intervening years, four of the six justices who had endorsed a
flat rejection of Fourteenth Amendment free speech rights in Cheek had left the
Court, leaving only Brandeis and Holmes, both of whom had begun to embrace
free speech principles in one form or another even before Cheek.2 9 Besides San-
ford, the three Cheek dissenters-Taft, McReynolds, and Van Devanter-were
now joined by George Sutherland, Pierce Butler, and Harlan Fiske Stone.220 This
is not meant to suggest hat votes of the Cheek dissenters or the Gitlow majority
213. Patterson, Fox, and Brandeis's Gilbert dissent did not purport to resolve the question, although the
Gilbert dissent made it clear where he stood on the question, at least insofar as Due Process would be used to
protect commercial contractual interests. See Gilbert v. Minn., 254 U.S. 325, at 334-43 (1920) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
214. Citation to Coppage might have been sensible as an oblique support for rights of voluntary association
had Cheek not expressly discussed its logic and implications at some length. Sanford's Cheek-distinguishing
footnote also included a citation to the Fifth Edition of Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, published in
1891, declaring it "absurd" to suppose that rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of religious worship
were unprotected by the due process guarantee. The language originated in fourth edition of Story's treatise,
edited by Thomas Cooley and published in 1873.
215. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925).
216. See id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
218. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sister, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
219. See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).Their assent to Cheek's declaration is therefore somewhat puzzling. The most likely explanation
would seem to be norms of acquiescence. See Barry Cushman, Inside the Taft Court: Lessons from the Docket
Books, 2015 SuP. CT. REv. 345, 348 (2015). Even so, given Brandeis's statement in his Gilbert dissent, it is odd
for him not to have sought and obtained a modification of the emphatic language in Pitney's opinion-particu-
larly since the same sentence of the opinion repudiated any claim to a constitutional right of privacy, language
that was likely to grab Brandeis's attention. Cf Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); Samuel D. warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 198-99
(1890).
220. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, Sup. CT. U.S., https://www.supreme
court.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2020).
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indicated in any way that these justices who cast hem were free speech enthusi-
asts.2 My point is that there remained no one on the Court besides Holmes and
Brandeis who had signed onto Cheek's rejection of free speech protection, and
that three members of Sanford's majority had supported an outcome in Cheek
that was at least consistent with the free speech theory that had been advanced in
Gitlow.222
By 1927, two years after Pierce and Gitlow, it was dejA vu all over again.
In the early spring, the Court handed down its decision in Farrington v. To-
kushige,22 3 another case following on Pierce and authored by McReynolds, this
time invalidating an act of the Hawaii territorial legislature restricting foreign
language instruction. Shortly afterward, the Court issued its decision in Whitney
v. California,224 upholding a conviction under a state criminal syndicalism stat-
ute. Again writing for the Court, Justice Sanford asserted "the freedom of speech
which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak,"
and that the legislature could reasonably punish conspiracy to advocate the use
of violence or unlawful means to accomplish political changes, including by
membership in the Communist Labor Party of California.225 Justice Brandeis
wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Holmes, which is today remembered as
221. Justice Pitney also wrote the Court's opinion in Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Perry, a companion case
to Cheek involving a similar statute and handed down the same day, and there too Taft, van Devanter, and
McReynolds dissented without written opinion. Chicago, R.I. and P. Ry. Co. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548 at 549-50,
556 (1922). It is unclear whether Perry involved a free speech claim or only a more general liberty of contract
claim, and it could be argued that the three silent dissenters objected on grounds having nothing in particular to
do with freedom of speech (or silence). Neither the Court's opinion nor the record of pleadings and proceedings
in the case is entirely conclusive. In Perry, the employee, who had prevailed in state court, argued that his former
employer had not seriously challenged the constitutionality of the statute at trial; Pitney's opinion concluded,
however, that the Supreme Court could hear the case because the challenged state court decision had ruled on the
federal claims for which the employer was seeking Supreme Court review. See id. at 550-52. But what were
those claims? On the one hand, Justice Pitney's opinion only expressly mentioned free speech arguments in
connection with arguments in state court under the state constitution. See id at 555. On the other hand, the Court
disposed of the entire due process argument in the case simply by referring to its due process discussion in Cheek,
which explicitly did reject a claim of Fourteenth Amendment-based speech protection and distinguished Lochner
and other seminal due process cases in doing so. Id at 526. Moreover, the state court decision in Perry spoke
generally of "the right of free speech guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitutions
of the various states" and quoted Holmes's famous falsely-shouting-fire dictum in Schenck v. United States in
support of its rejection of the employer's claim. See Dickinson v. Perry, 181 P. 504, 512 (1919) (quoting Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 53 (1919)). Equally significant, the brief of the employer seeking Supreme Court
review in Perry quoted language from state free speech decisions in the course of advancing a general due process
argument, blending the two. See Brief of Plaintiff in Error, at 11-12, Chicago, RI. & P. Ry. Co. v. Perry, 259
U.S. 548 (1922) (No. 157). The argument for "liberty of silence" was premised in substantial part on the view
that relations between employer and employee are "a matter of wholly private concern," and a rigid distinction
between free speech arguments and liberty-of-contract and similar due process liberty doctrines may be anach-
ronistic, or at least unnecessary to show an early concern for speech interests under the Fourteenth Amendment
among justices broadly sympathetic towards pre-New Deal due process jurisprudence. See Cheek, 259 U.S. at
540-43.
222. See Cheek, 259 U.S. at 548; see also Justices 1789 to Present, SuP. CT. U.S., https://www.su-
premecourt.gov/about/members-text.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2020).
223. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
224. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
225. Id. at 371-72.
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one of the foundational texts in modern First Amendment law.226 Echoing
Holmes's statement in Gitlow and his own in Gilbert, Brandeis began by remark-
ing that "[d]espite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive,
it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure," and therefore "all
fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty" are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment, including the right to freedom of speech.227
The same day Whitney was decided, the Court released its decision in Fiske
v. Kansas, 228 another case involving prosecution under a state criminal syndical-
ism statute with yet another opinion by Sanford. This time a unanimous court
voted to overturn the conviction.2 29 The defendant had been charged under the
statute by virtue of his membership in a branch of the Industrial Workers of the
World.2  The indictment recited various provisions from the preamble to the
organization's constitution, such as that "there can be no peace" between capital
and labor, that between the two classes "a struggle must go on until the workers
of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth, and the machinery
of production," and that "we must inscribe on our banner the revolutionary
watchword, 'Abolition of the wage system.' 2 3 The Court concluded that none
of these statements allowed an inference that the results they advocated were to
be accomplished by anything other than lawful means, and thus while criminal
syndicalism was in principle punishable under Whitney, conviction without proof
that an organization advocated unlawful means was impermissible.232 Brandeis
and Holmes would have insisted upon a showing, at a minimum, that the organ-
ization advocated "immediate serious violence," but the full Court agreed that a
clear showing that an organization advocated violence was needed in any partic-
ular case.233
Whitney and Fiske were followed four years later by Stromberg v. Calfor-
nia and Near v. Minnesota, both authored by Chief Justice Hughes.
234 Stromberg
invalidated a state statute banning the display of red flags "as a sign, symbol or
emblem of opposition to organized government."2 35 Gitlow, Whitney, and Fiske,
wrote Hughes, had determined that the liberty under the Due Process Clause em-
braces the right of free speech.236 He concluded that the statute's prohibition on
use of flags to express political opposition was invalid on its face. Hughes offered
little explanation except to say that "free political discussion" was "a fundamen-
tal principle of our constitutional system," ensuring that government was respon-
sive to popular will and that changes could be accomplished without resort to
226. See generally id at 373-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
228. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
229. Id. at 387.
230. Id. at 382.
231. Id. at 382-83.
232. Id at 386-87.
233. Id at 376 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
234. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. California 283 U.S. 259 (1931).
235. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369-70.
236. Id. at 368-69.
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revolution.2 37 Butler and McReynolds both dissented on essentially procedural
grounds, though Butler added that he considered it unnecessary to determine
whether
The mere display of a flag as the emblem of a purpose, whatever its sort, is
speech within the meaning of the constitutional protection of speech and
press, or to decide whether such freedom is a part of the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment or whether the anarchy that is certain to fol-
low a successful "opposition to organized government" is not a sufficient
reason to hold that all activities to that end are outside the 'liberty' so pro-
tected.2 38
It is unclear whether he was questioning whether the specific activities at issue
were properly protected by the Fourteenth Amendment (flag displays as em-
blems of purpose or conduct intended to bring about opposition to organized
government) or instead whether he was questioning whether the Fourteenth
Amendment protected speech and press at all.
Near invalidated an injunction obtained by a state prosecutor pursuant to a
state statute barring the publication of newspapers deemed to be "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory," unless to truth, good motives, and justifiable ends
could be demonstrated.239 Hughes again reiterated that it "was no longer open to
doubt" that the Due Process Clause protected the freedoms of speech and press,
the Court having found it "impossible to conclude that this essential personal
liberty of the citizen was left unprotected by the general guaranty of fundamental
rights of person and property."2 0 And while Hughes offered the usual statements
that these freedoms were held subject to the police power and were not absolute,
he used the same analytical framework deployed in Meyer, explicitly drawing
from the Court's liberty of contract cases: Contractual liberty is subject to the
police power, but that power "stops short of interference with what are deemed
to be certain indispensable r quirements" of that liberty-wage and price re-
strictions. 241 Freedom of speech and press, too, entailed "indispensable require-
ments" that limited the police power itself. To this, he said that these were to be
determined with reference to the "historic conception" of the freedom at issue,
prompting a foray into English constitutional history, the American colonial ex-
perience, and the writings of Blackstone, Madison, and others.242
Once again Butler dissented on essentially procedural grounds, and this
time all three of his fellow Horsemen joined his dissent.243 Here, too, Butler in-
cluded a somewhat cryptic comment about incorporation, stating that it wasn't
until 1925 (i.e., Gitlow) that the Court was called on to decide whether the Due
Process Clause protects speech and press rights, but that the question "has finally
237. Id
238. Id at 376 (Butler, J., dissenting).
239. Near, 283 U.S. at 702, 722-23.
240. Id at 707.
241. Id at 707-08.
242. Id at 708-20.
243. Id at 723-29.
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been answered in the affirmative."244 Butler cited Gitlow, Fiske, and Stromberg,
with additional references to Patterson v. Colorado, which had left the issue un-
decided, and to Cheek, seemingly implying that it had also purported to reserve
the question, which it manifestly had not done.245 At any rate, Butler, the only
member of the Court to have so much as hinted at any resistance to free speech
and free press incorporation, had signed on, at least in principle.
Finally, in 1936, the Court decided Grosjean v. American Press, ending
this first chapter in the story of the First Amendment's application to the
states.246 Grosjean involved a Louisiana tax on advertising revenue of high-cir-
culation newspapers, essentially applicable only to large urban dailies.
247 These
had generally been hostile to Huey Long, the legendarily demagogic Governor
and Senator, and there was ample evidence the measure was intended to target
his critics, with Long himself apparently describing it as "a tax on lying, 2¢ a
lie." 24 8 The tax was struck down, with Justice Sutherland writing for a unani-
mous Court.249 Sutherland essentially dodged the objection that Fourteenth
Amendment liberties excluded corporations, and avoided the related proposition
that the right to withhold corporate recognition allowed a state to impose re-
strictions on corporate activity, which had so often been used to deny constitu-
tional claims.250 Sutherland declared speech and press freedoms to be fundamen-
tal and linked them to both the language of natural right and to curtailing
"misgovernment."25 1 He relied extensively on English history, offering the first
Milton citation in a speech or press case, as well as references to the more im-
mediate circumstances surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment.252
Like Hughes in Near, he also ended his historical inquiry there-if it was possi-
ble to conceive of any relevant antebellum developments, they went unmen-
tioned.253 And he read that history expansively, concluding that English common
law protections did not go far enough, and interpreting the notion of "prior re-
straints" stressed by Blackstone to include taxation.
25 4
After that, it was off to the races. The Court would invalidate the challenged
provision in seven of the next speech and press cases that came before it, all
handed down within the next four years. These would involve prosecutions for
244. Id at 723-24.
245. Id. at 723-24.
246. The Court appears to have received only one request for review presenting freedom of speech or press
issues in the five years between Near and Grosjean in Herndon v. Georgia, in which the Court dismissed on
procedural grounds, with Cardozo, joined by Brandeis and Stone, dissenting. See Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S.
441 (1935). A later iteration was decided on the merits. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
247. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 240 (1936).
248. Brief for Appellee, Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (No. 303), 1935 WL 32673 at *9.
249. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250-51.
250. See id at 244.
251. Id at 244-50.
252. See id. at 245-46.
253. See id at 245-49; Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
254. Cf John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 418 (1983).
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subversive activities,25 5 injunctions against labor picketing and other union ac-
tivity,256 and restrictions on leafletting (including the first of many cases appear-
ing in the U.S. Reports involving Jehovah's Witnesses).2 57 Two of these were
unanimous, two were decided by five-four votes, and the remainder garnered
dissenting votes from Butler and McReynolds, or, after Butler's departure from
the Court, McReynolds alone.258 The single case upholding a challenged law was
Associated Press v. NLRB, the only speech or press decision to consider a federal
statute (to which the First Amendment directly applied) or to involve a challenge
to progressive social legislation.259
Hughes's opinion for seven justices in Stromberg conclusively established
the applicability of free speech principles to the states under the Due Process
Clause, if indeed there were grounds for doubt after Gitlow or Fiske and Whit-
ney.260 And with Butler's unequivocal statement in Near, the entire Court was
on record as having accepted the proposition.26 1 No one on the Court opposed it
at any point, unless Brandeis's join in Cheek is counted, much less argued against
it.262 The argument was implicit and simple: freedom of speech and press are
"fundamental," and the fundamental liberties are those, as Meyer had said, are
those protected by the Due Process Clause.263 There was no serious appeal to the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor to the wider history of the due pro-
cess.264 It also bears noting that virtually none of the parties discussed the issue
either. Gitlow's brief did devote several pages to the matter, though it largely
restricted itself to platitudes extracted from prior cases and avoided any First
Amendment complications, such as the Hurtado principle.265 The state men-
tioned the issue only in a short supplemental brief, its discussion consisting of
two conclusory header sentences eemingly directed to the Privileges or Immun-
ities question, followed by a short excerpt from a Supreme Court decision.266
Fiske's brief mentioned the issue only in the penultimate paragraph, stating that
there was no need to discuss it in light of Gitlow, while the opposing state brief
ignored the issue completely.267 Stromberg took the applicability of speech
255. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1937).
256. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 91-92 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 109 (1940);
Hague v. Comm. for Industrial Org., 307 U.S. 496, 501-03 (1939).
257. Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 154-158 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444,447-48 (1938).
258. See cases cited supra notes 256-57.
259. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 122 (1937).
260. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931).
261. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 723-24 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting).
262. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
263. Meyer v. Nebraska, 362 U.S. 390, 399-401.
264. See id; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
265. Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 11-18, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (No. 19).
266. Brief of the State of New York in Support of the Constitutionality of Sections 160 and 161 of the Penal
Law of the State of New York at 7-9, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (No. 19).
267. Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 21, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (No. 48); Brief of Defendant in
Error, Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (No. 48). The states' briefs in whitney and Ruthenberg v. Michigan,
273 U.S. 782 (1927), similarly did not contest Fourteenth Amendment protection for speech and related expres-
sive activities. See Brief of Defendant in Error on Rehearing at 30-33, whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927) (No. 3); Brief of Defendant in Error at 13-23, Ruthenberg v. Michigan, 273 U.S. 782 (1927) (No. 44).
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rights as a given, and the state made no attempt to contest the point.268 Which
made a lot of sense. Framed at a high level of generality, how could it not be
true? In some sense, Slaughter-House itself had said as much, if authority was
needed for the proposition.
What remained to be determined was whether the Due Process version of
free speech and press would track the First Amendment. The most serious paral-
lel to the First Amendment was drawn by Butler in his Near dissent, which un-
dertook an examination of the history of the history of freedom of speech to
match Hughes's.269 Apart from a single passing reference in Gitlow, the First
Amendment itself was never so much as mentioned in the Court's opinions in
Cheek, Gitlow, Whitney, Fiske, Stromberg, or Near.270 In terms of doctrinal con-
ceptualization, Due Process speech and press rights were distinct and independ-
ent from the First Amendment: This was an overlap, not a cross-reference, view.
Yet while Holmes had suggested in his Gitlow dissent that the principle of free
speech might "perhaps" entail a "somewhat larger latitude of interpretation" than
the First Amendment's federal prohibitions, that possibility was never explored
as a formal doctrinal matter and does not appear to have been pursued informally
either. 271 Indeed, if anything, the opposite occurred. The Court both reviewed far
more state measures than federal ones and did not actually invalidate a federal
law on First Amendment grounds until the mid-1960s.272 There were also possi-
bilities for bifurcated standards inasmuch as the liberty protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause had been held to apply only to natural persons, not to corporations.
But McReynolds had suggested one pathway around the problem in Pierce, and
the Court seemed willing just to ignore the issue.273
So far as Brandeis and Holmes, as leaders in the extension of the First
Amendment, are concerned, this Study will not attempt to explore the underlying
motives or thought processes, other than to note that both openly expressed the
proposition that since the Due Process Clause had been used to strike down state
laws, it might as well be used to protect freedom of speech. That is one sense in
which the Lochnerian backstory of the Fourteenth Amendment proved important
to the incorporation plot. It is difficult to imagine that they would have otherwise
intervened on behalf of speech rights or sought to overturn Barron or Cruikshank
without the pedigree those cases provided.
It is also difficult to imagine, moreover, that the decision would have been
reached had it provoked a sharper division. The decision to make the states sub-
268. Brief of Appellant at 14, Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (No. 584).
269. Near v. Minnesota, ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 723-34 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting).
270. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S 652, 666 (1925). see generally Near, 283 U.S. 697, Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
271.Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
272. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 306 (1965).
273. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (holding that corporations are persons under
Fourteenth Amendment and not addressing whether they can invoke liberty protections). The issue did emerge
in the rubble of fragmented opinions in Hague v. CIO. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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ject to the First Amendment was essentially unanimous, at each critical junc-
ture.274 In this, the general structure of substantive due process assisted in mul-
tiple ways. One was simply comfort with the deployment of the Due Process
Clause to invalidate state law. So too was the language of Due Process, most
especially as developed in cases like Meyer and the language of fundamental
liberties. 75 The structure of the doctrine also played a role. The Court was ac-
customed to the police powers limitation on Due Process liberties, and could
reasonably conclude that the application of the First Amendment to the states
would not entail significant legal or social transformation. At the same time, the
incipient sense of heightened protection for certain core aspects of constitutional
liberty, evidenced by cases like Coppage v. Kansas and adopted in Meyer, pro-
vided a template that would turn First Amendment protections into more than
that.276 The same is true of other aspects of the limits on constitutional rights in
the pre-New Deal period. In particular, the problem of conditional benefits, or
the rights-privileges distinction, served to limit the scope of constitutional pro-
tection in myriad ways, a chief example being the state's power to control cor-
porate behavior through its franchising power. It would require significant inno-
vation to overcome these conceptual obstacles and unleash the modern First
Amendment. All of these features would have been understood as inherent limits
that would have made the adoption of speech and press protections easier to
swallow. This was especially so given that the litigants themselves tended not to
stress, or even acknowledge, the issue, as well as the Court's willingness to treat
its own arguendo assumptions as definitive holdings. These palliating features
themselves trace to the fact that First Amendment incorporation was possible
only by establishing a relatively clear connection to existing doctrinal principles
and practices.
What is also evident is that the incorporation decision was not undertaken
on the basis of what today we would recognize as a serious inquiry into original
meaning, nor was there any real attempt to grapple with the implications for the
division of power between the states and the national government, particularly
in terms of the dynamics of state constitutional law. Rather, the argument pro-
ceeded in terms of what might be called general principles, a kind of broad for-
malism, and, to a lesser degree, appeals to history and legal tradition. By the time
incorporation of the criminal procedure rights had become a serious live issue,
First Amendment incorporation was firmly established, and the transformation
from an overlap to a cross-reference conception was well underway. When Hugo
Black sounded his battle call in 1947 in Adamson, the foundations for the trans-
formation he sought were in place and the doctrines and concepts originating in
the now-repudiated jurisprudence of the gre-New Deal Court that had helped to
enable them could be safely disregarded.77
274. See, e.g., Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (unanimous).
275. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923).
276. See id. at 401; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915).
277. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
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Although this is somewhat more speculative, the precedence of First
Amendment incorporation within the larger incorporation story is probably ex-
plicable on three principal grounds. First, the criminal procedure cases entailed
higher stakes, at least initially. States are responsible for the overwhelming bulk
of criminal prosecutions today, and the federal role was even smaller in the pe-
riod when modern incorporation began. The Supreme Court would later court
controversy in its First Amendment decisions with aggressive positions on more
contentious topics like obscenity,278 as well as its interpretation of the religion
clauses;279 by and large, however, its most controversial expansions took place
after Mapp's launch of the criminal procedure incorporation process, and, more-
over, after the Court had already embarked on a string of other high-profile in-
terventions, most notably Brown v. Board.2
80 In the earliest years of First
Amendment incorporation, the Court's most provocative decisions were almost
certainly those invalidating laws targeted at subversive activity, but the decisions
in those cases were themselves premised in part on a kind of obsolescence.
28 1
The Court mostly avoided issues that were likely to have widespread and imme-
diate effects on large numbers of people. Its various interventions on behalf of
local regulation of Jehovah's Witnesses did not begin to compare in their impact
with, for instance, the conclusion that the exclusionary rule in Weeks now applied
in every criminal trial in America.282
The second reason is related to the first but more fundamental. Doctrinal
development under the First Amendment prior to incorporation was scant, and
as a practical matter, the gap between a cross-reference and an overlap concep-
tion grounded in principles of fundamental justice was very slight. Even if the
First Amendment were understood as directly binding on the states, it would have
made very little difference in terms of the Court's discretion to fashion whatever
doctrinal rules it saw fit and to retain flexibility for future cases in a way it simply
could not have done with the criminal procedure clauses. Moreover, while a
cross-reference view conception at least suggests the rules should apply the same
way to both state and federal action, often enough, the sort of legislation being
scrutinized-leafletting restrictions, for instance-was relatively unlikely to
have much direct parallel at the federal level.
The fact that there was little practical difference between an overlap and a
cross-reference understanding also had an important linguistic parallel. Even if a
case made no mention of the First Amendment, it was at least likely to refer to
rights of freedom of speech, press, or assembly, which is to say, the First Amend-
ment's textual content.283 This in turn made it easier to mention the First Amend-
ment, once protection of those rights had been recognized. Under the orthodoxy
278. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484-94 (1957).
279. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,430-35 (1962).
280. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
281. Gitlow and Whitney came some years after the first "red scare" had subsided. See Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U.S. 357, 371-72 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667-76 (1925).
282. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); see, e.g., Prince v.
Massachusetts, 312 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1944).
283. E.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
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of overlap, the Court through the 1940s tended to speak in terms of the Four-
teenth Amendment protecting the same underlying right that the First Amend-
ment protects,284 which in theory might leave some room for differences in the
way the right was protected at the state and federal level. But in a relatively short
span of time, a relatively simple shift took place from speaking of rights "secured
by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States" that are "sim-
ilarly secured to all persons by the Fourteenth against abridgment by a state,"285
to speaking of rights "guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,"286
and from there to speaking in terms of "[ t he First Amendment, which the Four-
teenth makes applicable to the states,"287 as Justices Douglas, Black, and
Rutledge conspicuously began to do.
The upshot is that the very structure of First Amendment was conducive to
incorporation first because freedom of speech and its relatives were likely to en-
tail a smaller impact both qualitatively and quantitatively, at least in the short
term. First Amendment incorporation was less disruptive than criminal proce-
dure incorporation would be and it gave the Court far more discretion than it
would have had. And this proved critical to the larger incorporation process, fa-
cilitating a longer-term shift from an overlap model grounded in a more fluid
concept of fundamental justice to a more uncompromising cross-reference
model-since at the start there was very little difference. In this way, the First
Amendment cases could draw from existing doctrines and traditions while at the
same time laying the groundwork for an eventual transformation of those doc-
trines in the criminal procedure context, where that transformation would make
the most difference.
IV. CONCLUSION
The incorporation controversy is surrounded in myth that tends to obscure
its basic nature. As it unfolded during the Twentieth Century, incorporation con-
sisted of essentially two pieces, First Amendment and criminal procedure incor-
poration, with a small supporting role for the Takings Clause. First Amendment
incorporation preceded and enabled criminal procedure incorporation, not only
by establishing a precedent for incorporation but because, unlike in the criminal
procedure context, there was little difference between a due process-centered
284. E.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.444, 450 (1938) ("Freedom of speech and freedom of the press,
which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental per-
sonal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.").
285. See Schneider v. New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); see also Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 n.3 (1942) (First Amendment protection is "mirrored" in Fourteenth.).
286. See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943).
287. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); see also Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321
U.S. 573, 574 (1944); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157, 162, (1943) ("We have repeatedly held that the Fourteenth Amendment has made applicable to the states
the guaranties of the First."); Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600, (1942) (Stone, J., dissenting), vacated,
319 U.S. 103 (1943); cf Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 518 (1945) (referring to "Fourteenth Amendment, as
it incorporates the First."); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940) (referring to the protections
of "the Fourteenth [Amendment] through its absorption of the First.").
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view in which the Fourteenth Amendment of its own force entailed rights that
overlapped with the First Amendment and a view in which the Fourteenth
Amendment directly applied the First Amendment to the states.
First Amendment incorporation, at least of speech and press protections,
took shape during the 1920s and was cemented by the late 1930s, prior to Caro-
lene Products.28 It was supported in substantial ways by Lochnerian strands in
the court's jurisprudence and found support from the justices who most vigor-
ously opposed the New Deal transformation in constitutional law. The shift from
an overlap to a cross-reference conception of incorporation may have been inev-
itable, but it seems to have been calculated at some level to leverage lawyers'
formalism to expand federal constitutional supervision of state criminal pro-
cesses. From the standpoint of constitutional politics, this formalism has come a
somewhat ironic full circle, resulting in both the incorporation of the Second
Amendment and otherwise tending to limit direct free-form supervision of state
criminal process on grounds of general miscarriage of injustice.
288. See United States v. Carolene Prods., Co., 204 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); supra Part I; supra Section
H.B.
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